仲裁早新聞：法院只在仲裁庭的決定超出合理範圍時才對其進行幹涉（新加坡案例）
2020年2月28日，在China Machine New Energy Corp v Jaguar Energy Guatemala LLC & Anor[2020] SGCA 12一案中，新加坡上訴法院重申法院只在仲裁庭的決定超出合理範圍時才進行幹涉，而本案中仲裁庭作出僅律師可見令的行爲並未違反程序正義，且並未對上訴人的權利造成嚴重影響。不僅如此，上訴人未勤勉主張其權利，甚至同意修訂仲裁時間表並堅持主證據聽證會如期舉行，因而上訴法院維持初審法院裁定，拒絕撤銷裁決。
一、背景介紹
本案主要涉及仲裁庭在仲裁程序中做出僅律師可見令的合法性問題。“僅律師可見令”是指在商事訴訟或仲裁中，若證據涉及機密信息，但卻又需要一定程度的披露的，則法院或仲裁庭可以通過下達該令而使得該文件僅得由律師或專家證人查閱，當事人自身不得查閱的制度。
本案上訴人中國機械新能源股份有限公司是承包商，與被上訴人危地馬拉公司訂立合同，進行該公司名下的發電廠的建設。《工程、采購與建設合同》中約定，若發生爭議則當事人可據國際商會（ICC）1998年《仲裁規則》規定將爭議提交新加坡仲裁，仲裁條款規定了快速仲裁，其作出裁決的期限爲選定第三名仲裁員開始的90日；若仲裁庭多數同意，則可以再延期90日（Notably, cl 20.2 provided for an expedited arbitration: it required that the award be issued within 90 days of the selection of the third arbitrator; or, if the majority of the arbitrators agreed, within a further 90 days.）。
之後本案涉案工程發生延誤，被上訴人于2014年1月終止合同並提起仲裁。本案仲裁庭于2014年3月組庭，依照仲裁協議案件應在2014年6月之前作出裁決，若延長該期限則應在2014年9月之前作出裁決。雙方于2014年5月同意修改仲裁時間表，之後仲裁庭作出了數個程序令，其中有涉及證據披露的問題。
被上訴人擔心上訴人會濫用文件中的信息，尤其是中止協議之後的承包商的信息來幹擾該項目的進行，包括威逼利誘其他承包商，使其他承包商不爲被上訴人完成項目。因此，被上訴人表示僅願意以“僅律師可見”爲基礎向上訴人的律師和專家證人披露13項證據，並主張這些證據不得披露給上訴人的員工。之後，仲裁庭支持被上訴人主張，作出包括“僅律師可見令”（Attorneys’- Eyes Only Order）。
各方當事人于2014年12月18日在第三號程序令中對某些時間表達成了合意。在後續的仲裁程序中，仲裁庭屢次修改了僅律師可見令，並最終撤銷了該令。
在仲裁期間，上訴人還對其代理律師和專家證人團隊人選進行大量撤換，逾期提交專家證人意見，而且程序中還有一些涉及證據披露的問題。
主證據聽證會于2015年7月進行，與此同時，涉案項目的施工于該月完工。仲裁庭于2015年11月作出裁決，被上訴人勝訴。
上訴人不服，于2016年2月申請撤銷仲裁庭的裁決，其中主要主張之一是僅律師可見令對其不公平，仲裁庭並未給其充分機會以回應被上訴人的主張。初審法院駁回其撤裁申請，上訴人不服，向上訴法院提起上訴。
二、法院認定
上訴法院駁回上訴。
1、法院僅在仲裁庭的決定超出合理範圍時才進行幹涉
法院認爲仲裁庭確實認定存在強迫性理由以讓其下達僅律師可見令，而法院並沒有理由推翻該決定（First, the Tribunal did make a determination that there were compelling grounds to impose the AEO Regime, and there was no reason to disturb that determination (GD at [139]–[147]).）。
依照Triulzi Cesare SRL v Xinyi Group (Glass) Co Ltd[2015] 1 SLR 114案，法院的正確做法是結合事實情況審核仲裁庭的作爲或者不作爲是否超越了合理範圍，對于此（1）僅應參考仲裁庭在關鍵時刻所知的情況來評估仲裁庭的行爲和決定，不能參考仲裁庭所不知道的情形（the tribunal’s conduct and decisions should only be assessed by reference to what was known to the tribunal at the material time），而在Triulzi Cesare案中，法院即認爲認爲Triulzi不能批評仲裁庭未考慮Triulzi其本身未提交仲裁庭考慮的事項（the High Court held that Triulzi could not criticise the tribunal for failing to consider something that Triulzi itself had not put before the tribunal for its consideration）；（2）依照Call Internet Services Ltd v Telus Communications Co [2013] BCAA 366案，法院在行使程序裁量權時，應基于以下事實給予仲裁庭一部分尊重：（i）仲裁庭在仲裁程序方面有著廣泛的裁量權，並且（ii）仲裁庭在複雜事實背景下行使裁量權，法院可能並不了解其中的一些細致的要點。因此法院不應對仲裁庭的程序決定進行微觀管理，而應該對仲裁庭的程序決定給予“實質性的尊重”（the court should accord a margin of deference to the tribunal in its exercise of procedural discretion. Deference is accorded in recognition of the fact that (i) the tribunal possesses a wide discretion to determine the arbitral procedure, and (ii) that discretion is exercised within a highly specific and fact-intensive contextual milieu, the finer points of which the court may not be privy to. It has therefore been said that the court ought not to micromanage the tribunal’s procedural decision-making, and will instead give “substantial deference” to procedural decisions of the tribunal）。
這意味著，依照ABB AG v Hochtief Airport GmbH [2006] 2 Lloyd’s Rep1案，法院不會僅因爲其做法可能與仲裁庭不同即幹預仲裁，而法院需要滿足很高的要求才得幹預仲裁，法院必須有實際依據來主張仲裁庭“非理性或反複無常”地進行了仲裁程序，或者仲裁庭的訴訟程序“與合理預期的仲裁程序相差甚遠，必須予以糾正”（This means that the court will not intervene simply because it might have done things differently (Soh Beng Tee at [58], citing ABB AG v Hochtief Airport GmbH [2006]2 Lloyd’s Rep 1 at [67]). Overall, the threshold for intervention is a relatively high one: there must be a real basis for alleging that the tribunal has conducted the arbitral process “either irrationally or capriciously” (SohBeng Tee at [65(d)]), or where the tribunal’s conduct of the proceedings is “so far removed from what could reasonably be expected of the arbitral process that it must be rectified” (ASM Shipping at [38]).）。對此，上訴法院認爲沒有理由撤銷仲裁庭的裁決。
2、本案不存在舉證責任倒置的情況
上訴人主張僅律師可見令將舉證責任倒置，導致上訴人應承擔舉證責任，因而違規，裁決應被撤銷。上訴法院指出舉證責任從未倒置，而還是由被上訴人負責證明對于某個或某類文件應被授予僅律師可見令（the burden of proof was never moved to CMNC – it remained on Jaguar to establish that for each document or class of documents, an AEO order was warranted）。
此外，法院重申本案要點並不在于僅律師可見令是否對上訴人的案件准備工作造成不利影響，而是仲裁庭作出僅律師可見令的結果是否超出合理範圍地不公平或不合理。
3、仲裁庭的做法並未違反程序正義
上訴法院認爲，仲裁庭在作出僅律師可見令時確實審慎地考慮了其對上訴人可能造成的潛在不利影響（the Tribunal did carefully weigh the potential prejudice to CMNC in making the AEO Order），並且駁回上訴人主張的仲裁庭的做法違反自然正義的主張。
上訴法院認爲，仲裁庭只是根據實際情況盡力而爲，以在當事人之間的利益取得平衡，主要表現在：首先，上訴人保留了在僅律師可見令第二階段下申請查閱文件的選項，但卻從未使這種途徑具有可行性，因而認爲該等申請過程會“繁重且不具有可操作性”是不對的，而法院認爲這種操作相對而言比較直截了當；第二，《修訂裁定》消除了由于適用僅律師可見令而導致的任何不利；第三，依上訴人申請仲裁庭重新設置了仲裁程序時間表，這表明在上訴人在知曉僅律師可見令、《修訂裁定》的前提下對新時間表作出了同意；第四，在對時間表達成合意後，上訴人的律師做出了多項保證，其中包括上訴人及其專家證人都已知曉精簡過後的時間表，並且上訴人及其專家證人能做到這些時間表的要求（First, CMNC retained the option of applying for access under the second stage of the AEO Regime, but never availed itself of this avenue of access. There was no basis for thinking that the application process would be “onerous and impractical”; the Judge thought the process would likely have entailed “a relatively straightforward exercise” (GD at[156]–[157]). Second, the Redaction Ruling (which was made less than a month after the imposition of the AEO Regime) would have cured any prejudice caused by the application of the AEO Regime (GD at [158]). Third, the Tribunal reset the procedural timetable for the Arbitration pursuant to CMNC’s request by issuing PO 3, which reflected timelines that CMNC itself had agreed to in the context of the AEO Regime and the Redaction Ruling (GD at [159]). Fourth, after the timelines were agreed, CMNC’s counsel gave multiple assurances that they (and CMNC’s experts) were aware of the compressed timelines and that they would be able to meet them (GD at [160]).）。
4、僅律師可見令並未造成嚴重影響
上訴人還主張其專家證人的准備工作受到了僅律師可見令的嚴重影響，但上訴法院駁回其主張，理由是上訴人主張的違規的行爲並不對其造成不利影響，而嚴格形式的僅律師可見令僅存在了一個月，在那之後，上訴人的員工即可訪問那些文檔，其中的敏感信息已經被塗黑，而即便後來仲裁庭針對較小額度的索賠文檔恢複了僅律師可見令，但上訴人一開始就對此進行了同意（In any case, we do not see how CMNC could have been prejudiced by any alleged breach. The AEO Regime, in its most restrictive form (meaning when these documents were presumptively not subject to disclosure to CMNC’s employees at all), lasted less than a month. Thereafter, CMNC’s employees received access to redacted documents, and although the AEO Regime was later reinstated for the smaller claim documents, this was an arrangement that CMNC, as we have noted, had initially agreed to.）。
上訴法院還注意到，僅律師可見令在主證據聽證會前四個月即被取消（In any case, all restrictions were lifted by 18 March 2015 – almost four months before the main evidentiary hearing in July 2015.）。
此外，各方當事人于2014年12月18日在第三號程序令中對某些時間表達成了合意，即該等時間表是在僅律師可見令的背景下達成的，因此上訴人被視爲已經考慮過僅律師可見令對其可能造成的不利影響之後才對這些時間表達成合意的（It must also be noted that the parties had agreed to certain timelines in PO 3 on 18 December 2014 (see [36] above). In other words, these timelines were agreed in the context of the AEO Regime, and therefore must be taken as having accounted for whatever adverse impact the AEO Regime would have had on CMNC’s ability to meet those timelines.）
5、上訴人未勤勉主張其權利
上訴法院指出，原則上，若一方當事人主張在仲裁過程中有嚴重違規，則該方當事人必須讓仲裁庭適當意識到若其繼續采取其行動則該方當事人會對此提出異議（if a party intends to contend that there has been a fatal failure in the process of the arbitration, then there must be fair intimation to the tribunal that the complaining party intends to take that point at the appropriate time if the tribunal insists on proceeding）。
主張存在違規的當事人至少應努力中止仲裁程序，直到對該違規受到適當救濟爲止。主張存在違規的當事人不能單純保留其立場而直到裁決作出後視結果再決定是否提出異議（This would ordinarily require that the complaining party, at the very least, seek to suspend the proceedings until the breach has been satisfactorily remedied (if indeed the breach is capable of remedy) so that the tribunal and the non-complaining party has the opportunity to consider the position. This must be so because if indeed there has been such a fatal failure against a party, then it cannot simply “reserve” its position until after the award and if the result turns out to be palatable to it, not pursue the point, or if it were otherwise to then take the point.）。
上訴法院指出，上訴人一方面主張仲裁程序違反自然正義，但在另一方面則表現出自己可以且有能力和意願來繼續仲裁，這構成了自相矛盾（In the final analysis, it is a contradiction interms for a party to claim, as CMNC now does, that the proceedings had been irretrievably tainted by a breach of natural justice, when at the material time it presented itself as a party ready, able and willing to carry on to the award.）。在本案的這種情況下，當事人若選擇這種做法則應責任自負，法院不允許當事人采取機會主義策略對沖其可能面臨的風險（If a party chooses to carry on in such circumstances, it does so at its own peril. The courts must not allow parties to hedge against an adverse result in the arbitration in this way. ）。
如果上訴人確實認爲因爲僅律師可見令的程序違規問題而不應在2015年7月舉行聽證會，則其有責任向仲裁庭明確說明這一點，使仲裁庭意識到這樣做會剝奪其公平聽證權而導致嚴重錯誤程序。但是，上訴人不僅沒有要求中止仲裁程序，甚至堅持要求在2015年7月舉行主證據聽證會（If indeed CMNC believed that proceeding with the hearing in July 2015 in the circumstances it was presented with was impossible, then it was incumbent on CMNC to make that abundantly clear to the Tribunal. Specifically, CMNC had to bring home its concern that proceeding with the main evidentiary hearing at that time would be futile because it would be on terms that denied it a fair and reasonable opportunity of preparing its case and this resulted in a fatally flawed process. However, and as mentioned at [165]– [166] above, not only was this not done, CMNC never requested a vacation of the July 2015 hearing dates. On the contrary, CMNC persisted in maintaining that it wished to press on with the main evidentiary hearing in July 2015.）。這導致上訴人的仲裁庭失控的主張存在自相矛盾之處（this puts the lie to CMNC’s submission that the Tribunal had “lost control”）。
上訴法院認爲其並無幹涉仲裁庭裁決的理由，因而駁回上訴。
三、評論
一般而言，仲裁庭在作出諸如僅律師可見令這樣的程序措施的時候需要權衡三方面的權益，其一是案件審理的需要，其二是持有該機密信息的當事人的保密需要，其三則是對方當事人的平等權和程序正義。由本案可以看出，新加坡法院的立場是整體上尊重仲裁庭進行案件審理的需要，只要仲裁庭的做法在合理範圍內即予以尊重，重申法院不應對仲裁庭的程序決定進行微觀管理，而法院必須有實際依據來主張仲裁庭嚴重違規或偏離合理預期的情況下才進行介入。
本案中法院拒絕介入的主要原因包括：仲裁庭實際上考慮了本案的情況以及對上訴人可能造成的潛在不利影響才作出僅律師可見令；此外，僅律師可見令的影響較小，在主證據聽證會前四個月即被取消，而且嚴格形式的僅律師可見令僅存在了一個月，之後上訴人的員工即可訪問刪去敏感信息的文檔；不僅如此，當事人自身並未努力申請中止仲裁程序，反而同意修改仲裁時間表，堅持主證據聽證會按時進行，因而在一定程度上視爲對僅律師可見令的同意。
從本案中可以看出，若當事人對仲裁庭的做法有疑慮，則應及時提出並申請中止仲裁程序，不能默許，甚至支持仲裁程序繼續進行，而事後再以仲裁庭違反正當程序申請撤裁，否則可能會被法院認爲其認可仲裁庭的做法。
信息源于：臨時仲裁ADA
