導讀：近日，英國對華關系全國委員會（UKNCC）邀請國防部國際軍事合作辦公室安全合作中心前主任、中國前駐納米比亞國防武官、清華大學戰略與安全研究中心研究員、中國論壇特約專家周波，和英國駐華使館前武官何儒博(Rupert Hollins)海軍准將，以《中國已經主導西太平洋了嗎？》爲同一主題，分別撰寫評論，並在其官網“客座撰稿人”欄目，以對話形式發布。 周波認爲，全球化的中國不需要在任何地方尋求主導地位。相反，中國需要全球化思維，承擔大國責任，展現大國應有的擔當。北京日前宣布申請加入《全面與進步跨太平洋夥伴關系協定》（CPTPP），看起來更像是多邊主義的堅定領導者。 何儒博則認爲，中國的崛起是各國積極調整其印太戰略的根本原因。中國希望美國可以讓出西太平洋地區(甚至整個亞太地區)的軍事主導權，連同其在全球範圍內的領導力。但是美國卻已開始重振旗鼓。《2021美國創新和競爭法》(US Innovation and Competition Act 2021)便是美國四年來通過跨部門、全政府手段應對中國構成的挑戰的最新補充。 中國論壇特翻譯兩篇評論全文，以飨讀者。
【文/周波】
1999年，時任倫敦國際戰略研究所研究室主任的西格爾（Gerald Segal）在《外交事務》發表了一篇題爲《中國重要嗎?》的文章，引發了一場軒然大波。談及中國的經濟、政治和戰略問題的方方面面，他最終得出的結論是——中國的重要性被嚴重誇大了。在西格爾先生看來，中國只是一個“對世界無關緊要的小市場，特別是對亞洲之外的地區”。
二十多年後的今天，西格爾先生想必正在墳墓裏輾轉反側，眼巴巴看著當年的觀點讓自己淪爲笑柄。今天的中國不但不是“一個小市場”，反而變成了世界上最大的零售市場、消費市場、電子商務市場、奢侈品市場，甚至新車市場。同時，中國也是最大的貿易國、最大的工業國和最大的出口國，以及約130個國家的最大貿易夥伴。過去的四十年裏，中國的發展突飛猛進，勢不可擋，亞洲金融危機、特朗普對華貿易戰等各種挑戰都無法阻擋其前進的步伐。
如今新冠病毒全球肆虐，然而中國就像是這場全球風暴的台風眼，是地球上最安全的避風港。中國雖然第一個受到疫情影響，但也第一個從疫情中恢複，成爲2020年全球唯一實現經濟正增長的國家。
同時，中國向他國提供援助。截至6月底，中國已向約100個國家提供4.5億劑疫苗。
但是，無論這些數據多麽驚人，得出21世紀會是“中國主導的世界秩序”的結論是不可取的。事實上，即使在中國的大本營東亞地區，中國也尚未取得完全的主導地位。
遼甯號航母編隊/資料圖來自中國軍網
對比擁有共同文化和宗教淵源的歐洲，亞洲自一開始就充滿了多樣性，具有各自獨特的地理特征、多元的文化與宗教習俗。盡管過去的數個世紀，中國人自視是世界的文化、政治與經濟中心，君主有權統治“天下”，但中國從未試圖統治整個東亞。明清兩代皇帝想要的不過是藩屬國對中華帝國的臣服與朝貢。
中國在東亞的經濟主導地位是毋庸置疑的。2010年8月，中國超過日本成爲世界第二大經濟體。據英國經濟與商業研究中心（CEBR）預測，到2028年，中國將取代美國成爲世界第一大經濟體。
作爲曆史上最大的貿易集團，RCEP（《區域全面經濟夥伴關系協定》）的成員國約占世界人口的30%，GDP規模占全球經濟總量的30%，但是美國卻缺席了該協定。而就在RCEP簽署幾天後，中國表示積極考慮加入《全面與進步跨太平洋夥伴關系協定》（CPTPP），北京看起來更像是多邊主義的堅定領導者。
東亞不會以中國爲中心。雖然有“大中華”的說法，其包括中國大陸、香港、澳門和台灣，有時還包括新加坡，但沒有迹象表明中國人希望輸出他們的意識形態或發展模式。
如果一國的勢力範圍意味著其在本地區擁有一定程度的文化、經濟、軍事或政治排他性，並且其他國家表示遵從，那麽仔細觀察就會發現，東亞並不像是中國的勢力範圍。盡管中國反對，朝鮮還是執意發展核武器。日本、韓國和泰國又都是美國的盟友。
部分東盟國家與中國在南海也存在領土爭端，包括越南、菲律賓、馬來西亞、文萊等。
中印萬河谷沖突 截圖來自央視
不斷崛起的中國會使世界變得更美好嗎？這是21世紀的終極問題。即使是那些對中國最挑剔的人也無法否認，過去四十年中國的崛起是和平的—這是罕見的大國崛起。中國自1979年改革開放以來就沒有發生過戰爭。
因此，2020年6月中印邊界地區加勒萬河谷鬥毆事件是極不尋常和令人遺憾的，該沖突造成20名印度軍人和4名中國軍人死亡，以至于印度外交部長蘇傑生表示，雙邊信任“受到嚴重幹擾”。
但是，雙方軍隊均選擇用拳頭和木棍這樣石器時代的鬥毆方式，說明他們明白無論如何都不能打破默契，向對方開槍。
從這個意義上說，成熟和理性仍然占主導。隨著中印軍隊撤出各自聲稱屬于自己的邊境地區，並建立了一段緩沖區，局勢已經有所緩和。希望兩國政府能從這次致命鬥毆事件中吸取教訓，尋找加強彼此信任的新方法，比如在兩軍之間建立熱線電話。
東亞地區的真正挑戰並非中國如何和鄰國打交道——數千年的曆史接觸已經讓他們學會如何交往相處——而是中國如何和美國共存。作爲非西太平洋國家，美國卻自稱是“自由開放的印太地區”的守護者。中國懷疑美國想將中國的影響力遏制在西太平洋內，而美國懷疑逐漸強大的中國正試圖將其趕出該地區。展望未來，特朗普政府發起的大國競爭只會變得更加激烈。
問題在于大國競爭是否會讓彼此陷入雙方都不想看到的對抗。
回顧冷戰這段曆史，北京和華盛頓之間難以降低沖突風險有兩個原因。首先，在冷戰期間，華盛頓和莫斯科各自勢力範圍泾渭分明，這使它們能夠避免直接對抗。但中美之間甚至連緩沖區都沒有。如今，美國海軍艦艇經常在南海和台灣海峽的中國島礁附近海域航行。
其次，美國和蘇聯通過相互確保摧毀保持勢力平衡。這一點不存在于北京和華盛頓之間。但在西太平洋，由于中國人民解放軍幾十年的發展進步，中美軍事實力差距正在縮小，對中國越來越有利。因此，華盛頓擴大東亞軍事投資，並呼籲其全球盟友和夥伴聯合起來對付中國。這些行爲反倒會激怒北京，使局勢變得更加動蕩。
美國無法保證與中國在第一島鏈的軍事沖突中穩贏，第一島鏈從日本延伸到菲律賓和中國南海。但是如果美國輸了，其影響將産生多米諾骨牌效應：美國將失去在該地區盟友和夥伴的心中的威望和信譽；聯盟將分崩離析，美國不得不收拾行囊，打道回府。
盡管中國缺少全球軍事基地，其全球影響力已經彰顯，特別是通過“一帶一路”等大型項目。“一帶一路”是人類曆史上規模最大的基礎設施項目。全球化的中國不需要在任何地方尋求主導地位。相反，它需要全球化思維，承擔大國責任，展現大國應有的擔當。
【文/何儒博】
中國夢
爲了實現中華民族偉大複興的中國夢，中國確立了“兩個一百年”的奮鬥目標。也就是在中國共産黨成立100年時（2021年）全面建成小康社會，在新中國成立100年時（2049年）建成富強、民主、文明、和諧的社會主義現代化國家。中華民族近代以來最偉大夢想的實現彰顯了中國的綜合國力，涵蓋政治、外交、經濟、貿易、科技、金融科技、信息化和數字化、網絡空間安全、創新以及軍事。事實上，中國在上述領域已經對世界産生了舉足輕重的影響。
新時代的中國強軍夢
中國人民解放軍是一支聽黨指揮的人民軍隊，有望成爲世界一流的軍隊。軍事力量的強大離不開國家強盛，同時也是保證國家強盛的前提。習近平主席認爲，強國需要強軍，軍強才能國安，兩者相輔相成。如今，中國的經濟實力爲中國軍隊的全面改革和現代化提供了強有力的支撐。其目標是：到2049年建成“世界一流的武裝力量”。在國家主導、國家補貼的戰略下，例如軍民融合(Military-Civil Fusion)，以及人工智能(AI)、量子技術、新興和顛覆性技術的進步，將加速實現該目標。
國慶70周年閱兵，裝備方隊通過天安門廣場。圖自新華社
首要地位的勢力範圍
中國表示永遠不會成爲世界霸主。傳統分析認爲中國的雄心至少是尋求一個地區的主導地位和全球領導地位——換句話說，是以亞太地區爲中心的主導地位並成爲更具包容性的全球領導者。我們可以把這個問題暫時擱置，站在中國的立場想象一下，西太平洋的軍事夢想會是什麽樣子。
中國強軍夢的涵義
令中國不悅的是，西太平洋地區被劃分爲中國經濟勢力範圍和美國安全勢力範圍。美國印太司令部有37.7萬多名軍事和文職人員。駐日美軍有54000名軍事人員，以及美國駐韓國部隊有28500人。
對中國來說，一個“美夢”可能是美國從國際日期變更線東部撤軍，終止在該地區的防禦協議，不對台灣提供援助，停止近距離偵察飛行，停止在南海的航行自由行動。屆時，隨著美國的退出，美國的合作夥伴和盟友慢慢解散。該地區內的其他國家也無法幹預中國對基于本國利益的追求，特別是在東海和南海區域。
夢想而非現實
這個夢想還沒有成爲現實。美國仍處在該地區軍事平衡的優勢地位。美國的國防預算約爲中國的三倍。盡管這一優勢被中國較低的軍事成本削弱了，尤其是在軍事工資、表外資金和對其他國家沒有幫助的研發捷徑方面。中國說“中國人民解放軍仍然遠遠落後于世界領先的軍隊”，實際上是指美國的軍隊，這不是在撒謊。以遠征能力爲例，中國仍在努力打造航母戰鬥群、兩棲特遣部隊、戰略空運、中途加油飛機和可以向全球投放軍力的“戰略重點樞紐”。而美國運作這些遠征軍事力量，以及具有前沿的和可持續作戰能力的陸軍、艦隊、海軍陸戰隊遠征軍和空軍已經有幾十年了。
逐步實現夢想
中國正在穩步實現其戰略目標。在質量上，中國的艦船、綜合防空系統、巡航導彈、彈道導彈都處于世界領先的地位。在作戰能力上，中美的核力量和彈道導彈防禦系統正處于一個“刺激-反應”、輪流主導的循環之中。
在可部署的投射能力上，美國太平洋司令部(USPACOM)在西太平洋地區正感受到來自中國的壓力。2020年7月，美國空軍太平洋司令部副司令預測，與美國印度洋-太平洋司令部(INDOPACOM)的指定部隊(而非美國全部軍隊)相比，中國軍隊在軍事實力上更勝一籌。他表示，中國在第一島鏈(北起千島群島、日本列島、琉球群島、台灣島、菲律賓北部群島、巴拉望島、婆羅洲，最終南北向分布在越南附近)內擁有“主場優勢”。2021年3月，因擔心當前局勢會帶來不利于美方的軍事平衡，美國印太司令部司令稱，美國需要在軍備數量和質量上“重新獲得優勢”。他說，“美國的輝煌始于關島”，但他其實可以再補充一句，“我不希望輝煌就此終結”。
行使主導權
中國處理中美關系的基本模式是“不沖突，不對抗，互相尊重，互利共贏”。接下來我們也有可能看到中國像《孫子兵法》中所描述的那樣，不戰而勝。真正強大的部隊有打贏戰爭的軍事實力，但卻可以做到“不戰而屈人之兵”。即使是不動用軍事力量，中國也在積極調用其他體現其國力的手段來實現自己的安全目標。
中國以在不引發武裝沖突的情況下實現目標見長：立場堅決強硬，卻不見開火。這種非常規沖突形式現如今被廣泛稱爲“灰色地帶(grey zone)”行動。中國的南海公共外交策略就是一個很好的示例。相比起通過部署艦身爲黑色的海軍軍艦以達到威懾效果，中國派遣了艦身爲白色的海警(China Coast Guard)和乘坐相似藍色拖網漁船的海上民兵。後者本是和平時期海上執法的象征，但實質上，這都是屬于中國的武裝力量。雙方一旦爆發沖突，局勢就會變得險象環生。受制于地理條件，美國的在武力選項上會十分被動，而中國軍隊則會有很大的地利之便。中國的反介入/區域拒止(Anti-Access and Area Denial，A2AD)戰略始終將美國協防台灣的軍事力量視爲重點。該戰略防禦圈的影響範圍現已擴展至第二島鏈(從東京起經過關島和帕勞，再到印度尼西亞的伊裏安查亞)。
中國的彈道導彈命名充滿了“殺氣”，專門狙殺航母的DF21D被稱作“航母殺手”，能對關島基地精准打擊的中遠程彈道導彈DF26被命名爲“關島殺手”。台灣是中美之間最容易爆發的沖突點，同時也是檢驗兩國在西太平洋地區軍事主導權的重要地域。不論是中國“武統”台灣失敗，抑或是美國的軍事介入失敗，都會在戰略上産生嚴重的後果。
衆所周知，反對兩棲登陸是非常困難的，在一直在爲這個做准備的台灣也是如此。中國用短程彈道導彈發射常規彈頭和核彈頭到台灣只用6到8分鍾，但這只會爲占領軍留下一片混亂和憤怒的人群。一旦戰鬥開始，把它遏制到局部戰爭是不太可能的。兩個核超級大國防止事態升級到其本土的下坡路可能很難找到。中國領導層是理性的，會計算風險。大多數政策聲明都強調“和平統一”。
中國彈道導彈DF21D 圖自新華社
美夢的終結或是變成噩夢
未來中國在西太平洋地區的戰略規劃很有可能會被打斷，或是直接被粉碎。如果美國失去了在西太平洋的軍事主導地位，那麽日本便可能重新增強其軍事力量，繼而演進成爲一個核大國。朝鮮半島的統一與無核化可能會對中國不利。而當前的國際環境與國際形勢對中國而言遠沒有看上去那麽簡單。中國將這歸咎于美國。美國、歐盟、德國和法國都有各自的印太戰略。英國也在2021年最新的《安全、防務、發展和外交政策綜合評估報告》中宣布了其重點傾向印太地區的安全政策。同時，印度、日本和澳大利亞也正在調整適應當前印太地區的戰略發展前景。
中國的崛起是各國積極調整其印太戰略的根本原因。北約(NATO)稱中國對國際秩序構成了“系統性挑戰”；歐盟將中國定位爲“合作夥伴、談判夥伴、經濟競爭者和制度性對手”;七國集團呼籲各國單方面采取行動改變現狀，緩解由中國崛起造成的地區緊張局勢。當然，美國也絕不會在一旁坐視不管。最新通過的《2021美國創新和競爭法》(US Innovation and Competition Act 2021)便是美國四年來通過跨部門、全政府手段應對中國構成的挑戰的最新補充。
調換指揮棒與殺手锏？
中國的宏大敘事總體上是從曆史決定論的態度強調“東方崛起，西方衰落”。中國希望美國可以讓出西太平洋地區(甚至整個亞太地區)的軍事主導權，連同其在全球範圍內的領導力。但是美國卻已開始重振旗鼓。“太平洋威懾倡議”著重強調了美國的軍事主導地位。但如果以上計劃無法奏效，中國在將來獲得了西太平洋地區的軍事主導權，那麽手握指揮棒的中國將需要放棄其殺手锏。殺手锏是弱小的軍事力量用極爲不對稱的方式來戰勝實力更強一方所 依靠的工具。當前美國軍隊分布零散，部署靈活，比以往更具活力與殺傷力，如果美國可以聚焦當前與中國的戰略競爭，重新調整其軍事投入，重建能有效投射的軍力，那麽這支軍隊很有可能成爲美國將來的“殺手锏”。
（翻譯：中國論壇/湯卓筠；校譯：中國論壇/許馨勻、韓桦）
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Is China’s primacy over the Western Pacific already a reality?
【Zhou Bo】
In 1999, Gerald Segal, then Director of Research at the International Institute of Strategic Studies, made a considerable splash with his essay “Does China matter?” in Foreign Affairs. Touching upon the economic, political and strategic issue of China, his overall conclusion was that China’s importance had been greatly exaggerated. For Mr Segal, China is but a small market ‘that matters little to the world, especially outside Asia’.
Two decades later, Mr Segal must be turning in his grave to see how his argument has made him a laughing stock. Rather than “a small market”, China is now the largest retail market, consumer market, e-commerce market, luxury goods market and even new car market in the world. It is also the largest trading nation, industrial nation and the largest exporter in the world and the largest trading partner to around 130 countries. In the last four decades, no challenges have seemed able to stop China’s advance by leaps and bounds, be it the Asian financial crisis or Trump’s trade war with China, for instance.
Amid the ravaging pandemic, China looks like the eye of global storm, the safest haven on earth. It was the first to suffer from the pandemic, but also the first to recover from it, being the only country to have registered economic growth in 2020.
It is helping others, too. By the end of June, China has provided 450 million doses of its vaccines to nearly 100 countries.
However impressive these facts might be, it is wrong to conclude that the 21st century will be Pax Sinica. In fact, even in East Asia, China’s home ground, China’s primacy is not fully evident.
By contrast with Europe that is bound together by a common culture and religion, Asia has been diversified and pluralistic from day one with distinctive geographies, diversified cultures and religions. No matter how in centuries past, the Chinese thought China was the cultural, political or economic centre of the world and their sovereign had a right to rule “all under Heaven,” China never attempted to control the whole of East Asia. Deference to the Middle Kingdom and exotic gifts from tributary states were all that the Ming and Qing emperors wanted.
There is no doubt about China’s economic primacy in East Asia. In August 2010, China overtook Japan as the world’s second largest economy. According to the UK-based Centre for Economics and Business Research (CEBR), China will overtake the US to become the world’s largest economy by 2028.
With the US absent from RCEP- Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership, the biggest trade bloc in history that accounts for about 30% of the world’s population and 30% of global GDP-and with China’s expressed interest in joining the Comprehensive Progressive Trans-Pacific Partnership (CPTPP) just days after RCEP’s conclusion, Beijing looks a firm leader in multilateralism.
East Asia won’t be Sino-centric. Even if there is talk of a “Greater China” that encompasses mainland China, Hong Kong, Macau, and Taiwan and sometimes Singapore, there are no signs that the Chinese wish to export their ideological or development model.
If a sphere of influence means that a state has a level of cultural, economic, military, or political exclusivity in a region in which other states show deference to the power, then East Asia won’t look like China’s sphere of influence under scrutiny. DPRK has anyway developed nuclear weapons anyway despite China’s disapproval. Japan, Republic of Korea and Thailand are American allies.
Some ASEAN countries such as Vietnam, the Philippines and Malaysia and Brunei have territorial disputes with China in the South China Sea.
Would an ever-rising China make the world a better place? This is the ultimate question for the 21st century. Even those most critical of China cannot deny that China’s rise in the last four decades is peaceful -a rare phenomenon for any rising power. China has no war since its reform and opening up in 1979.
Therefore, the brawl resulting in the deaths of 20 Indian soldiers and four Chinese servicemen in the Galwan Valley in the border areas between China and India in June 2020 was most unusual and unfortunate, to the extent that Indian External Affairs Minister Subrahmanyam Jaishankar said that bilateral trust was “profoundly disturbed”.
But the fact that the two troops chose to use fists and wooden clubs to fight in a stone-age manner showed they knew they should not shoot at each other under any circumstances to violate a tacit agreement.
In this regard, a kind of maturity and rationality still prevailed. Since the Chinese and Indian troops have withdrawn from the border areas that each claimed to be its own and a de facto buffer zone established, the situation has de-escalated. Hopefully, the deadly brawl will provide useful lessons for the two governments in finding out new ways to enhance confidence-building, such as setting up a hotline between the border troops.
The real challenge in East Asia is not how China will deal with its neighbours and vice versa – they know how to deal with each other through thousands of years of historical engagement. It is how China might coexist with the US, a non-Western Pacific nation but a self- claimed guardian of the “free and open Indo-Pacific”. China suspects the US wants to confine Chinese influence within the Western Pacific while the United States suspects a stronger China is trying to drive it out of the region. Looking down the road, the great power competition initiated by the Trump administration will only become more fierce in days to come.
The question is whether competition will slide into a confrontation that neither wants.
Risk reduction for Beijing and Washington is difficult for two reasons if one looks into the history of the Cold War. First, during the Cold War, there were clearly separate spheres of influence dominated by Washington and Moscow that allowed them to avoid direct confrontations. But between China and the United States, there isn’t even a buffer zone. Nowadays American naval vessels regularly sail through the waters off Chinese islands and rocks in the South China Sea and the Taiwan Strait.
Second, the United States and the Soviet Union were balanced by mutually assured destruction. This is not found between Beijing and Washington. But in the Western Pacific, the gap in military strength is shrinking in China’s favour thanks to the advances of the PLA in the past decades. As a result, Washington is investing more militarily in the region and calling on its global allies and partners to gang up on China. This in turn would irk Beijing and make the situation more volatile.
There is no guarantee the US would win in a military conflict with China in the first island chain that stretches from Japan to the Philippines and the South China Sea. But should it lose, the consequence would be a domino effect: The US would lose prestige and credibility among its allies and partners in the region; The alliance would fall apart and it would have to pack and go home.
Short of global military presence though, China’s influence is already felt worldwide, especially through such mega-projects as the Belt & Road Initiative which is the largest project on infrastructure in human history. A global China doesn’t need to seek dominance anywhere. Instead, it needs to think globally and act responsibly in line with the great responsibility that is intrinsically associated with great powers.
【Rupert Hollins】
A Dream
The Chinese Dream of national rejuvenation has two centennial goals. The Communist Party’s centenary was on 1st July. New China’s foundation centenary is in 2049. This should be the apotheosis of China as a great power, exercising comprehensive national strength – political, diplomatic, economic, trade, tech, fintech, information and digital, cyber and space, innovation; and military, too. China is already impacting the world in all these dimensions.
Dreaming with Chinese Military Characteristics
The People’s Liberation Army, ever the Party’s army, now has a global mandate. Military might is both byproduct of, and pre-condition to, national greatness. For President Xi, a strong country and strong military go together.
China’s economic power underwrites wholesale reform and modernisation of its armed forces. The aim: by 2049 to have “world-class armed forces”. State-directed, state-subsidised, strategies such as Military-Civil Fusion, and advances in AI, quantum technologies, new, emerging and disruptive technologies will speed it there.
Sphere of Primacy
China says it will never be a world hegemon. Conventional analysis of China’s ambitions is that it seeks at least a regional primacy and global leadership – in other words, dominance centred on Asia-Pacific and a global leadership a little more accommodating. We can leave this as a moot point for now. Let’s imagine, in China’s shoes, what the military dream might look like in the Western Pacific.
The Meaning of the Dream
It irks China that its region is divided between a Chinese economic and a US security sphere of influence. US Indo-Pacific Command has over 377,000 military and civilian personnel. US Forces Japan number 54,000 military personnel, US Forces in South Korea 28,500.
A ‘good’ dream for China might look like withdrawal of US forces east of the International Date Line, the end of US defence agreements in the region, no assistance to Taiwan, cessation of closein reconnaissance flights, and the halting freedom of navigation operations (FONOPs) in the South China Sea. With the US out, its partners and allies melt away, and regional states are powerless to resist China’s pursuit of national interests, especially in the East and South China Seas.
Dream, Not Yet Reality
That dream is not yet reality. The military balance is still in the US’s favour. Its defence budget is about three times China’s, though that advantage is attenuated by China’s lower costs, especially for military wages, offbalance-sheet funding and shortcuts in research and development unhelpful to other states. China is not fibbing when it says the “PLA still lags far behind the world’s leading militaries”, by which it really means the US. One example, take expeditionary capability. China is still working on Carrier Strike Groups, Amphibious Task Forces, strategic air lift, refuelling assets and “strategic strongpoints” from which to project power globally. Whereas the US for decades has operated with these capabilities, and forward-positioned and sustained armies, fleets, marine expeditionary forces and air forces.
Realizing the Dream
China is steadily realising its dream. On quality, Chinese shipbuilding, integrated air defence systems and cruise and ballistic missiles are already top-notch. On capability, Chinese and US nuclear forces and ballistic missile defences are in an action-reaction cycle for dominance.
On deployable power projection, USPACOM is feeling Chinese push-back in the Western Pacific. In July 2020, USAF Deputy Commander USPACOM predicted Chinese military overmatch compared to INDOPACOM’s assigned (not all US) forces. He said China has “home field advantage” within the first island chain (Kuril Islands, main Japanese archipelago, Ryukyu Islands, Taiwan, northern Philippines archipelago and Palawan, Borneo and bending up to Vietnam). In March 2021 Commander INDOPACOM, worried about an unfavourable military balance, said the US needed to “regain the advantage” quantitatively and qualitatively. “America’s day begins in Guam”, he said. He could have added he does not want it to end there.
Exercising Primacy
China’s formula for a relationship with the US is “no conflict, no confrontation, mutual respect and win-win cooperation”. We would expect China to use Sun Tzu strategy to win without fighting. A strong military, able to fight and win is, paradoxically, a military that does not have to fight to win. Deterring the use of hard power against it, China exploits other levers of national power to achieve its goals.
China is skilled at getting its way without triggering an armed conflict. There is assertiveness, but not a fight. The term “grey zone” operations is in common use now to describe the activity. A prominent example is in the South China Sea, where instead of fronting up with grey-hulled warships which are obviously intimidating, China employs Maritime Militia in blue-hulled look-alike fishing trawlers and white-hulled China Coast Guard vessels, symbols of peace-time maritime law enforcement, but actually belonging to Chinese armed forces. If there were a fight, it would be a close call. US forces would be at stretch, Chinese forces would have deep field strength. China’s AntiAccess and Area Denial (A2AD) strategy holds at risk intervening forces. This strategy is being extended to the second island chain (from Tokyo through Guam and Palau, down to Indonesia’s Irian Jaya).
Ominously nicknamed ballistic missiles are the DF21D “carrier killer” and the DF26 “Guam killer”. Taiwan is the most likely flashpoint between the US and China, perhaps also the litmus test of military primacy in the Western Pacific. A failed invasion by China or a failed intervention by the US would be a strategic shock.
Opposed amphibious landings are notoriously difficult and will be so in Taiwan which has been preparing for them. Conventional and nuclear warheads are only a 6 to 8-minute bus ride away on Chinese short range ballistic missiles, but that will leave a mess and an angry population for their occupation forces. Once combat has started, containing it to a local war is unlikely. Off-ramps for two nuclear superpowers to prevent escalation to their homelands may be hard to find. Chinese leadership are rational and calculate risk. Most policy statements emphasise “peaceful reunification”.
Rude Awakening or Nightmare
The dream may stop with a rude awakening or turn into a nightmare. A Japan without the US might re-arm and become a nuclear power. A denuclearised, unified Korean peninsula could turn antithetical to China. The international situation is even more complicated for China. China blames the US. US, EU, Germany, and France each have their Indo-Pacific strategies. In the Integrated Review, the UK has announced its tilt to the Indo-Pacific. India, Japan and Australia are adapting strategic outlooks on Indo-Pacific.
China is the underlying reason. NATO calls China a systemic challenge; the EU calls China partner, competitor and systemic rival; the G7 calls out unilateral attempts to change the status quo and increased tensions. The US is not taking anything lying down. Its 2021 Innovation and Competition Act is a recent addition to four years of interagency, whole-of government, measures to tackle the China challenge.
Swapping the Baton and Assassin’s Mace?
China’s metanarrative is that the “east is rising, the west is declining”, an historical determinism. China expects the US to hand over the baton of Western Pacific (even Asia-Pacific) primacy and global leadership. However, the US is rallying. The Pacific Defence Initiative doubles down on military primacy. If it doesn’t work, and one day China seizes the baton of military primacy, China will have to let go of the assassin’s mace. This is the instrument of the weaker military power asymmetrically to overwhelm the stronger. US forces, now becoming dispersed, distributed, more dynamic, lethal, re-invested and re-focused for the strategic competition, may just be that mace.
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