隨著中國經濟實力越來越強大，中國的國家利益也更加廣泛。一些弱小的國家擔心中國會從強入霸，也有很多曾經強大因而不滿中國崛起分享蛋糕的國家試圖挑戰中國的利益。
對此，美國前駐沙特大使，國際關係學者柴斯·弗里曼（Chas Freeman）在美國《全球主義者》上發文稱中國在處理國際糾紛上一貫保持克制，但也立場鮮明。
（文章截圖）
文章稱，中國對於使用軍事力量一向非常謹慎，但是並不代表中國軟弱。其實中國領導人和軍方完全做好了保衛國家和國家利益的準備。中國軍人有決心，有紀律，而且目的明確，不會擴大態勢。
文章例舉了新中國建立以來的各次軍事鬥爭。在剛剛建國的時候，百廢待興的中國就進行了抗美援朝戰爭，將朝鮮半島局勢恢復到目前的既定情況。1958年，中國撤出朝鮮半島。
1962年，中印邊境衝突，中國用事實證明中國解放軍有能力擊敗印軍甚至推翻印度政府。不過中國還是撤回到了原來的位置。
（文章作者弗里曼，圖片來自網絡）
1979年，中國再次在戰場上告訴越南，試圖靠維持和蘇聯在地區建立霸權是不可能的。當越南服軟了之後，中國就撤回到了原來的位置。
在南海上，周邊小國屢次觸犯中國的核心利益，但是中國也是忍無可忍之後才出手干預的。中國在南海一直十分謹慎，不希望和當地的美國力量擦槍走火。但是後者卻總是狐假虎威虛張聲勢。
文章認為，中國對於和周邊國家的處理關係都表現克制，並且有著一套自己的的模式。
比如在中日釣魚島問題上，中國僅使用了海警，而不是海軍。中國在崛起的過程中收回了香港和澳門。對於中國來說，香港和澳門的殖民宗主國位於千里之外，完全可以使用武力統一，但是中國選擇了談判的模式。
今天中國和絕大多數周邊國家都通過談判解決了領土糾紛。在沒有完全解決領土糾紛的不丹也保持著和平的關係。
（滿洲里中俄邊境，圖片來自網絡）
這說明在和鄰國的交往中，中國在處理分歧方面有著高度的主動性和處理問題的能力，而且中國完全有能力避免使用武力。這也說明，中國的和平崛起是一個中國在努力踐行的承諾。
文章最後討論道，中國雖然傾向於用和平手段解決糾紛，但不代表中國軟弱。此處文章以台灣問題舉例。
台灣是中國的核心利益。自1979年停止炮擊之外，台海兩岸就一直沒再交過火。直到今日，雖然台灣的獨立勢力偶有挑釁，但是北京方面都保持克制。總是如此，中國從沒有放棄武力統一的選項。
文章總結道，中國從來都明確給出自己的底線，所以不應過分渲染中國的「侵略性」。中國政府在使用武力上十分審慎。中國目前財富和國際地位都在快速增長，不需要通過軍事也可以變得更加強大。而且就算中國使用武力，也是有地明確，手段明確的。並不會得寸進尺。
China clearly prefers to use measures short of war to protect itself but has shown that it is fully prepared to go to war to defend its borders and strategic interests.
Chinese uses of force have been notably purposive, determined, disciplined and focused on limited objectives, with no moving of the goalposts.
Chinese campaigns
In Korea, where ragtag Chinese forces fought the United States to a standstill from 1950 to 1953, China settled for the de facto restoration of the status quo ante bellum — strategic denial of the northern half of the Korean Peninsula to hostile forces. In 1958, it ended its military presence in Korea.
When border skirmishes escalated into war between China and India in 1962, China first showed India that, if provoked, the PLA could overrun it. Then, having made that point, China withdrew its troops to their original positions.
In the 1979 Sino-Vietnamese war, China accepted huge losses on the battlefield to teach Vietnam that the costs of continued empire building in association with the Soviet Union would be unacceptably high. Once Vietnam seemed convinced of this, China disengaged its forces.
China waited a decade to respond to multiple seizures of disputed islands and reefs in the South China Sea by other claimants. The Philippines began the process of creating facts in the sea in 1978, Vietnam followed in 1982, and Malaysia did the same in 1983. In 1988, China intervened to halt the further expansion of Vietnamese holdings.
Since then China has established an unejectable presence of its own on seven artificially enlarged land features in the South China Sea. It has not attempted to dislodge other claimants from any of the four dozen outposts they have planted in Chinese-claimed territories. China has been careful not to provoke military confrontations with them or with the U.S. Navy, despite the latter’s swaggering assertiveness.
Pattern of restraint
A similar pattern of restraint has been evident in the Senkaku Islands, which China considers to be part of Taiwan and Japan asserts are part of Okinawa. There, China seeks to present an active challenge to Japanese efforts to foreclose discussion of the two sides』 dispute over sovereignty.
It has done so with lightly armed Coast Guard vessels rather than with the PLA’s naval warfare arm. Japan has been equally cautious.
China negotiated the reunification of both Hong Kong and Macau, although it could have used force, as India did in Goa, to achieve reintegration.
China has negotiated generous settlements and demarcations of its land borders with Afghanistan, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Nepal, Pakistan, Russia, Tajikistan, and Vietnam. China’s borders with the former British Empire in Bhutan, India, and Myanmar remain formally unsettled but for the most part peaceful.
These interactions between China and its neighbors demonstrate a high degree of Chinese competence at managing differences without armed conflict. They provide grounds for optimism. War, including accidental war, between China and its neighbors – or China and the United States as the ally of some of those neighbors – is far from inevitable.
The Taiwan issue
China has been cautious even with respect to Taiwan – that most chauvinist of issues. There has been no exchange of fire between the civil-war rivals on opposite sides of the Taiwan Strait since 1979.
On Jan. 1 of that year, the United States accepted Beijing as China’s capital and ended its formal championship of Taipei in that role. Beijing responded by discontinuing its advocacy of the forceful 「liberation」 of Taiwan and announcing a policy aimed at peaceful reunification.
So far, despite occasional provocations from pro-independence forces in Taiwan, China has stuck with this policy, placing equal emphasis on enticement and intimidation. Beijing’s 「united front」 outreach to Taiwan complements the military pressure its growing capacity to devastate the island imparts to the imperative of cross-Strait accommodation.
The bottom line is that, while Chinese warnings must be taken seriously, Chinese aggressiveness should not be overestimated. China tends to act militarily with prudence, upon warning, not rashly. Its wealth and power are growing, giving it an incentive to defer confrontations to the future, when its relative strength will be greater and new opportunities to win without fighting may arise.
The record shows that China adheres to limited objectives, limited means, and limited time scales. On the other hand, it is characteristically determined, once the die is cast, to invest whatever level of effort is required to achieve its objectives.
China has been notably careful to avoid 「mission creep」 in the wake of success. There is no evidence that its ambitions are open-ended or unbridled. If given an inch, it is unlikely to seek to take a mile.
